The conclusion of the Second Karabakh War in 2020 presented a potential turning point for the South Caucasus. The Trilateral Statement signed on 10 November 2020 by Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia ended active hostilities and outlined a framework for regional cooperation. Of particular importance was Article 9, which proposed reopening transport links, including a corridor to connect Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic via the Armenian town of Meghri.
By Robert M. Cutler
Azerbaijan refers to this as the "Zangezur Corridor," invoking the region's historical identity as Western Zangezur, while Armenia calls its present-day province Syunik. Four years on, this vision remains unrealised. Rather than fostering collaboration, the Zangezur Corridor has become a geopolitical fault line, exposing entrenched tensions and competing interests in the South Caucasus.
The historical context and competing present-day visions
The Zangezur Corridor’s significance lies in its potential to restore connectivity, which was severed in the 1990s. During the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territories from 1993 to 2020, transport links between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan were systematically destroyed or fell into disuse. Soviet-era rail lines traversing Armenian territory, once vital for regional connectivity, were left derelict as Armenian authorities chose not to maintain them.
This loss of infrastructure deepened regional isolation, leaving Azerbaijan dependent on circuitous routes through Iran to access Nakhchivan. The proposed corridor, therefore, is not simply about logistics. It represents an opportunity to reverse decades of fragmentation and foster a new era of economic integration across the South Caucasus.
From Azerbaijan’s perspective, the Zangezur Corridor offers mutual benefits. Beyond re-establishing a direct link to Nakhchivan, the corridor could integrate Armenia into broader trade networks and strengthen regional connectivity. A critical component of this vision is the Kars–Gyumri–Nakhchivan–Meghri–Baku route, which would enhance Türkiye’s access to Central Asia and cement the South Caucasus as a transport hub.
Armenia, however, has resisted the proposal, accusing Azerbaijan of seeking extraterritorial control over the corridor—a claim Baku categorically denies. Instead, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has advanced an alternative: the “Crossroads of Peace” initiative, which seeks to position Armenia as a transport hub on its terms. Yet, insofar as this vision fails to address Armenia’s dependence on its neighbours, it will remain largely aspirational.
Regional stakeholders and divergent interests: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Türkiye, Russia and Iran
For Azerbaijan, connectivity is not merely an economic priority but a cornerstone of its regional strategy. Its success in projects such as the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railway illustrates its ability to implement large-scale initiatives, reinforcing its position as a critical link in the East-West corridor between Europe and Asia.
However, persistent Armenian obstruction has prompted Azerbaijan to seek alternatives. Recent agreements with Iran, including new transport links to Nakhchivan, demonstrate Baku’s adaptability in pursuing its objectives despite geopolitical challenges.
Armenia’s resistance to the Zangezur Corridor underscores its struggle to circumvent regional isolation. Since the 1990s, closed borders with Azerbaijan and Türkiye have left Armenia heavily reliant on its northern rail link to Georgia. Although Pashinyan’s “Crossroads of Peace” proposal seeks to reposition Armenia as a regional hub, the practical aspects of its implementation, in the absence of cooperation with Azerbaijan or Türkiye, will remain problematic.
Turkey views the Zangezur Corridor as integral to its broader ambitions for Eurasian connectivity. By linking Türkiye directly to Central Asia, the corridor would reinforce Ankara’s strategic outreach to the region.
Russia, by contrast, has taken a more cautious stance. In principle, Moscow supports regional transport initiatives but seeks to balance its influence over Baku and Yerevan. Russia’s leverage is limited to the degree that it lacks a direct transport link to Armenia itself. This, in turn, complicates its role as an effective mediator.
Iran, driven by fears that the Zangezur Corridor will diminish its role as a transit state, has emerged as a staunch opponent of the project. Tehran perceives the corridor as a threat to its role as the primary link between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan and facilitating trade between Türkiye and Central Asia. In response, Iran has strengthened its partnership with Armenia.
Russia and Iran should recognise the mutual advantages of improved connectivity. While their interests may diverge from those of others, initiatives like the Zangezur Corridor and cooperation with Türkiye and other actors offer a pathway to shared economic growth and geopolitical stability.
How to build on Azerbaijan’s successes to break the deadlock and the role of the West
Despite these challenges, Azerbaijan has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to advance its connectivity agenda. The BTK railway exemplifies its ability to execute large-scale infrastructure projects, while its recent agreements with Iran underscore its readiness to adapt when faced with obstacles.
These initiatives position Azerbaijan as a regional leader in connectivity, capable of driving integration even in a complex and often adversarial environment. The build-out of the Port of Alat, on the southwestern shore of the Caspian Sea, gives another example of this dynamic pragmatism.
To overcome its isolation, Armenia must adopt a more pragmatic approach. Collaborating with Azerbaijan on mutually beneficial projects, including the Zangezur Corridor, would provide economic opportunities while reducing its dependence on external powers.
Western engagement in the South Caucasus has been inconsistent and often counterproductive. In the early 2000s, the United States and the European Union declined to support the BTK railway, preferring to back initiatives that included Armenia. While the EU eventually recognised the BTK’s success, Western policies frequently prioritise geopolitical considerations over pragmatic solutions.
The United States and the European Union are critical in fostering regional stability. They should support balanced solutions and encourage cooperation among the South Caucasus states. Such a policy would help to bridge divides rather than deepen them.
The Zangezur Corridor highlights both the potential and challenges of regional connectivity in the South Caucasus: for Azerbaijan, it is a cornerstone of its connectivity strategy, and for Armenia, it represents an opportunity to emerge from decades of isolation.
Realising this vision requires more than technical agreements. It demands political will, pragmatic leadership, and constructive engagement from all stakeholders, international and regional. Success could enhance the South Caucasus as a fundamental link for Eurasian connectivity. Failure would only deepen the divisions plaguing the region, perpetuating the cycle of missed opportunities and unrealised potential.
